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THE VIRTUAL BIOECONOMY:




This article considers how the bioeconomy – conceived as a market consti-
tuted by and constituting technologies derived from the biosciences – can 
be usefully considered as a virtual economy in that the representations and 
practices of economic activity differ signiﬁ cantly from one another. It does so 
through an analysis of the economic theories on spatial innovation processes 
(e.g. clusters) that have proved a popular approach in economic geography. 
The article contrasts the theory of performativity with that of virtualism in 
order to illustrate how the failure of economic performativity helps to explain 
economic practices rather than assuming that economic theories necessarily 
‘work’ as implied by the theory of performativity. This has important implica-
tions for how we understand the bioeconomy because it means that we have 
to reconsider the production of biovalue. 
Keywords: Bioeconomics; bioeconomy; biovalue; clusters; economic perfor-
mativity; failed performativity; virtualism.
Introduction
In the social sciences there has been a growing interest in economies and mar-
kets that stretches beyond the conﬁ nes of economics. The recent ‘economic 
turn’ in science and technology studies (STS) represents one example of this 
trend although it also seeks to move beyond current debates in ﬁ elds critical 
of economics such as economic sociology. This STS agenda has been led by 
Michel Callon whose arguments about the performativity of economics (e.g. Cal-
lon, 1998a; 1998b; 1999; 2005; 2006; Callon, Méadel and Rabeharisoa, 2002; 
Callon and Muniesa, 2005) have proved especially popular. Other scholars 
such as Knorr Cetina and Preda (2001), MacKenzie (2003, 2004) and Mitchell 
(2005) have also produced work in this area, whilst recent events (e.g. the Said 
Business School workshops on Does STS Mean Business?) and publications (e.g. 
2002 special issue in Economy and Society 31(2); Barry and Slater, 2005a) further 
highlight the particular academic interest in the relationship between techno-
science and economics. 
Broadly speaking such work considers the interrelations and interdepend-
encies of technologies and economic theories, particularly how certain tech-
nologies (re)produce certain economic theories which in turn (re)produce 
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certain technologies. However, although the theories of Callon and others on 
the performativity of economics are now being widely applied, they have also 
encountered criticism from anthropologists like Daniel Miller (2002), who con-
tends that the theory does not adequately address the question of virtualism
in economics (see also Carrier, 1997; 1998; Miller, 1998; 2003; 2005). By this 
Miller means that economic theories produce abstractions of material practices 
which then come to assume greater importance than the practice itself (Miller, 
1998). 
This article seeks to engage in this debate between the theories of perfor-
mativity and virtualism through an examination of the bioeconomy. To this end 
it seeks to explore the ‘virtuality’ of the bioeconomy in relation to the spatial 
innovation processes in the UK biotechnology industry. In particular, it will 
question the emphasis in policy, commercial and academic circles on the biotech 
cluster by arguing that they are virtual abstractions of place. As such the article 
not only contributes to theoretical developments in STS and economic sociol-
ogy, but also to debates in economic geography on the relationship between 
space and innovation. Instead of arguing that economics necessarily ‘works’ as 
the theory of performativity contends, it draws on all three disciplines to exam-
ine how the failure of economic performativity contributes to our understanding of 
economies and markets by helping us to explain the making of the spaces of 
the virtual bioeconomy. Thus the central claim of this article is that we need to 
consider seriously how failure (to work) underlies economies and markets, sci-
ence and technology, and how it is through this very failure that we learn, adapt 
and change. Dynamism can be seen as a consequence of this failure of things to 
work, meaning that as economies and markets, science and technology become 
more complex they fail more often and therefore change more often. 
Such an approach is particularly relevant when considering the bioeconomy 
and the question of life as the centre of political (economic) calculation as 
argued by Foucault (1978) and others. To do so it is ﬁ rst necessary to clarify 
exactly what we mean by the concept of the bioeconomy – the central concern 
of this special issue. The more prosaic deﬁ nition used by policy-makers like the 
European Commission (EC) and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) does not really address the need for theoretical explica-
tion. For example, the OECD (2005: 9) deﬁ nes the bioeconomy as ‘that part of 
economic activities which captures the latent value in biological processes and 
renewable bioresources to produce improved health and sustainable growth 
and development’. In turn, the European Commissioner for Science and Re-
search, Janez Potocnik, deﬁ nes it as involving ‘different sciences and technolo-
gies, different industries, and different policy areas (EC, 2005: 1). Academic lit-
erature has also had a longstanding interest in the economics of the biosciences 
covering work in innovation studies (see Senker, 2005 for a review), political 
economy (e.g. Loeppky, 1999) and economic geography (e.g. Audretsch and 
Stephan, 1996; Cooke, 2001), although such work does not address the issues 
raised by the concept of bioeconomics. 
The more recent attempt to conceptualise the relationship between the bio-
sciences and the economy in terms of bioeconomics draws a much clearer link 
between the co-production of the biosciences and the economy (e.g. Rajan, 
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2006). A number of scholars have argued that the search for biovalue concerns 
the alignment of vitality or well-being, as opposed to mortality, with economic 
processes (Lemke, 2001; Rose, 2001; Waldby, 2002; Rajan, 2006; Rabinow and 
Rose, 2006). Broadly speaking they argue that the geneticisation and individu-
alisation of responsibility for health lead us to adopt a highly economic rela-
tionship with our own body (Novas and Rose, 2000; Lemke, 2005b). However, 
despite representing an interesting body of work, the bioeconomics concept, 
like that of performativity, does not address the possibility of failure. Further-
more, I will argue that bioeconomics (and consequently biopolitics) does not ad-
equately address the failure to calculate life in its theoretical approach. Instead 
it is crucial to understand the bioeconomy from a different perspective that can 
account for such a failure. This I term the logic of morbidity – as opposed to vital-
ity – in which the failure of health or well-being constitutes the bioeconomy.
I start this article with a discussion of the theoretical debate between perfor-
mativity and virtualism highlighting how the similarities and then difference be-
tween these concepts impact on our understanding of economies and markets. 
In so doing I will address the relationship between economic representations 
and practices and how they can help to delineate between the theories. This 
then leads into the discussion of the virtuality of the bioeconomy, especially in 
relation to the analyses of spatial innovation processes characterised as biotech 
clusters, which draws on the theory of Michael Porter (1990) in his book The 
Competitive Advantage of Nations as well as the broader application of this theory 
in understanding such processes in the UK biotech sector. Next I discuss how 
the failure of performativity as a theory enables a new way to understand econo-
mies and markets and how the failure of economic performance can be seen as 
a necessary component of market making. Finally I consider how the concept 
of bioeconomics necessitates a similar consideration of failure.
Debates on Performativity and Virtualism 
Similarities between Performativity and Virtualism
Although it is a relatively recent debate, there have been a number of exchang-
es between proponents of performativity and virtualism. In particular the pa-
per by Daniel Miller (2002) in Economy and Society has been criticised (Holm, 
2002), whilst it has also led to a later debate between Callon (2005) and Miller 
(2005) in which Miller sought to downplay the incompatibility of the theories. 
However, despite the sometimes vituperative exchanges, there are a number 
of similarities between the two theories that provide a useful starting point for 
this article. 
Although Callon (2005: 13–17) may disagree with the very idea that perfor-
mativity and virtualism share any ‘core assumptions’, there are at least two simi-
larities between the theories according to Miller (2005: 3); ‘the performative 
nature of economic action’ and an ‘interest in materiality’. 
The argument that economic theories are performative is not necessarily 
new since economists and others have addressed the problem of self-fulﬁ lling 
prophecies in economics before (e.g. Frank, Gilovich and Regan, 1993; Fer-
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raro, Pfeffer and Sutton, 2005). However, what is new about these theories is 
the speciﬁ c focus on the relationship between the performative and the mate-
rial world. The central similarity is therefore that economic models or theo-
ries are performed by economists (and ‘economists at large’ – Callon, 2005) 
through the use of economic technologies such as accountancy, intellectual 
property, computerised trading etc. (Barry and Slater, 2005b). In particular, 
Callon (1999) argues that actors need to be able to calculate to perform eco-
nomic theories meaning they need tools to make the world calculable (Callon, 
1998a; Barry and Slater, 2002). With virtualism there are similar concerns; Mill-
er (1998; 2003) uses the example of auditing in the public services in the UK for 
‘best value’ as one illustration. Here again there are speciﬁ c tools that make the 
world calculable, although in this case Miller argues that they represent virtual 
abstractions that bear little relevance to economic practices.
In relation to materiality, Miller (2005) argues that it both makes and is made 
by people thereby playing a central role in the economy. Here it is possible to 
argue further that materiality affects different people in different ways because 
small shifts in material circumstances will affect them differently (e.g. materially 
poor individuals will suffer more from a small downward shift in wealth than 
will rich individuals) (Miller, 1998). According to Callon (2005: 4) materiality 
is a crucial component of action since he argues that action and the production 
of meaning of action ‘takes place in hybrid collectivities’. Materiality is a central 
component of the socio-technical arrangements that Callon sees as central to 
agencement, or the distributed agency that is embedded in hybridities and col-
lectivities (see also White and Bradshaw, 2004). 
All this enables us to talk of the Technological Economy (Barry and Slater, 2002; 
2005a; 2005b) because it positions technoscience in a co-determinative rela-
tionship with the economy in that technoscience enables certain economic 
activities which in turn enable speciﬁ c forms of technoscience. Furthermore, 
according to Slater (2002: 235) this enables the theory of performativity to 
ask how calculativeness or the rationality of homo economicus is achieved rather 
than argue that calculation of such sort does not actually exist. This, of course, 
means that Callon has to posit that such a thing as rational calculation can and 
does exist in itself and through which people pursue their own interests or, 
more relevant to Callon’s case, agencements pursue their interests. Thus we 
could argue that the means and ends of agencements are in fact the pursuit of 
speciﬁ c, calculative interests that have not developed from anywhere, but are 
rather assumed to exist as part of the agencement. However, how this is so is 
unexplained. 
Differences between Performativity and Virtualism
In considering the differences between the two theories it is important to dis-
tinguish between representations and practices in the ‘performative nature of 
economics’. It is crucial to do so because this distinction helps to separate the 
concept of ‘performative’ from that of ‘performativity’ where the latter is spe-
ciﬁ cally developed by Callon especially in his argument that:
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In reality this struggle between statements is a struggle between socio-technical agence-
ments. It is not the environment that decides and selects the statements that will survive; 
it is the statements themselves that determine the environments required for their 
survival. (Callon, 2006: 28)
Here Callon does not seek to separate the representations (i.e. statements) 
from practices, but rather he argues that they are both components of the same 
process. One cannot exist without the other and both form part of the agence-
ment. In an earlier paper Callon (2005: 3) claims that such agencements are 
composed of both agencies and socio-technical arrangements, which ‘means 
assuming that agency is distributed and that concrete markets constitute col-
lective calculative devices’. Thus he further argues that markets require such 
arrangements to shape ‘calculative agencies’ and that there are numerous ac-
tors involved in the construction of such markets (2005: 8).  
In contrast, virtualism distinguishes between representations and practices 
by arguing that the former can consist of abstractions (i.e. virtual represen-
tations) of economic action that do not correspond to economic practices 
(Miller, 1998). This does not deny that socio-technical arrangements (or ma-
teriality) are important. In fact, Miller (2005: 4) states that he is ‘concerned as 
much with how materiality makes people, as with what people make’. Rather, 
he is concerned with how certain discourses (or representations) have come 
to dominate the world and that ‘… we need a better discrimination between 
those cases where there is the power to actualise the model of the market and 
those where no such imperative exists or there is no such power’ (2005: 11). 
In conclusion to this argument, Miller (2005: 11) stresses that ‘[i]n most cases 
economic activity is a failure of performance’ in which the consequences of 
economic practices is the opposite of the intentions embodied in economic 
models or representations.
Performativity starts with the basic assumption that economic theories actu-
ally ‘work’ (see Holm, 2002: 15). This is a necessary position to take because 
Callon’s (1998a: 2) original claim ‘consists in maintaining that economics, ..., 
performs, shapes and formats the economy, rather than observing how it func-
tions’. If economics does not ‘work’ then the economy is not performed, shaped 
or formatted in performative terms. However, the evidence for economic theo-
ries actually ‘working’ comes, in a circular fashion, from the existence of the 
economy which economics is supposed to perform, shape and format. Thus we 
can argue that performativity, by its very premise, is based on a normative claim 
about what markets (and economies) should consist of and what the applica-
tion of economic theories will produce (see Fine, 2003). With virtualism there 
is no such assumption, but rather an acknowledgement that some things (e.g. 
auditing claims) may be meaningless (Miller, 2003), just as some things may 
not work and that these two can be related. Consequently Miller (2002: 224) 
argues that economics, as set out by Callon, is a ‘moral and ideological system’ 
that provides the ‘normative conditions for exchange rather than a description 
of practice’. 
As the above discussion illustrates, it is useful at this point to distinguish 
clearly between the ‘performative nature of economic action’ as Miller (2005) 
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describes it in the concept of virtualism and the performativity of economics as 
Callon (2006) argues. On the one hand the performativity argument is based 
on the claim that markets are all essentially the same (i.e. ‘as a collective device 
for the evaluation of goods’), whilst there are also a ‘diversity of possible forms 
of market organization’ (Callon and Muniesa, 2005: 1245). This means that cal-
culation can be achieved in a number of different ways and that markets are the 
collective device to achieve this calculation. However, this view has been criti-
cised by Fine (2003: 479) for example for failing to ‘move beyond description 
to explanation’. On the other hand, virtualism contends that calculation is not 
necessarily the central feature of economic practices. Rather there are numer-
ous possible intentions, motivations and values that feature in economic prac-
tices, not all of which can be explained by the theory of virtualism and not that 
its proponents meant it to do so (see Miller, 1998: 211). However, the theory of 
performativity appears to be a totalising concept in that it aims to explain the 
market and economic activities in reference to hybridities (i.e. agencements) 
that could conceivably include everything. 
The most problematic element in performativity is the argument that rep-
resentations and practices are both elements in the same process because it 
means that we cannot refer to knowledge of the ‘economic’ as anything but 
claims about (and performance of) the ‘economic’. In contrast it could be 
argued that at least one sense of value is produced through practice and not 
representation in that economic practices have to be performed repeatedly 
to ensure their continuing power and not because they are performative (see 
Graeber‚ 2001). This would mean that practices of exchange produce represen-
tations of calculation and not the other way round because value is produced 
through people agreeing with the claim rather than the claim being realised 
in practices. In one sense then, such representations end up naturalising prac-
tices – whether past, present or future – as sensible because they are the result 
of previous performance. This is necessary because practices and representa-
tions are always at one remove from each other since the ‘performative nature 
of economics’ can only refer to both past and future representations to justify 
current representations and practices, whereas current practices can only build 
on past practices. 
The Virtual Bioeconomy and the Failure of Performativity
Spaces of the Virtual Bioeconomy 
In this section I argue that the bioeconomy, as it has come increasingly to be 
known, can be seen as a virtual abstraction of economic practices even if the 
claims made about it are compared with the evidence used to support those 
claims (e.g. quantitative descriptions and analyses). This view is reinforced 
when considering the projects by the EC (2005) and OECD (2006) to deﬁ ne 
the ‘bioeconomy’ as both innovative and beneﬁ cial. For example, the OECD 
project entails a deliberate policy agenda that ‘seek[s] to identify the necessary 
steps to realize the potential gains of what is called the bioeconomy’ (OECD, 
2006: 2, emphasis added). ‘Beneﬁ t’ and ‘potential’ are intertwined concepts 
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in this agenda, repeated numerous times throughout this policy literature, 
which essentialises and naturalises the claims made about its innovative poten-
tial. However, the virtualism of the bioeconomy is clearer when we consider its 
characterisation as a locally-bounded industry – i.e. the representation of it in 
terms of ‘biotech clusters’ (e.g. DTI, 1999a; 1999b) – and the beneﬁ t entrepre-
neurs are supposed to gain from such clusters. The rest of this section therefore 
outlines the underlying assumptions of cluster theory drawing on debates in 
economics and economic geography. 
The ‘cluster’ argument represents the life sciences in terms of highly net-
worked organisations and institutions that are located in speciﬁ c regional or 
national geographies because of the inherent characteristics of those places; 
e.g. San Francisco, California and Boston, Massachusetts are often identiﬁ ed 
as iconic clusters. A number of European regions like Cambridgeshire and 
Oxfordshire have also sought to identify themselves as clusters. For example, 
one ‘viewpoint’ in the Oxfordshire Bioscience Network (OBN) ‘cluster report’ 
states that ‘We recognise the important role the network plays in the develop-
ment of Oxford’s world class biotechnology cluster’ (OBN, 2002: 7).
In the same year The Oxford Trust produced a report titled Oxford Networks
in which it more cautiously argued that ‘In Oxfordshire, there appears to be a 
clustering effect of bioscience and medical establishments occurring in a band 
running north to south through the county’ (Oxford Trust, 2002: 13).
This policy literature emphasises the local-boundedness of biotech clusters, 
which is repeated in the bioscience trade literature. For example, there are 
numerous articles and reports on old, new and emergent clusters and national 
sectors from around the world in publications like Genetic Engineering News 
(GEN) and European Biotechnology News (EBN). Throughout this policy and 
trade literature the characterisation of the bioeconomy can be seen as a rep-
resentation of an industry that downplays the geographical diversity, speciﬁ city 
and distinctiveness of the sector and therefore produces a virtual abstraction in 
the form of the ‘cluster’.
The virtual abstraction of the ‘biotech cluster’ can be seen as originating 
in debates about biotechnology that have centred on the identiﬁ cation and 
deﬁ nition of territorial innovation processes and in particular the spatial con-
centration of the biosciences. This debate has revolved around the cluster con-
cept derived from the work of Michael Porter (1990) who initially conceived of 
clusters in functional terms (i.e. sectoral) before later expanding on his theory 
to include a spatial dimension (Porter, 2000; see Malmberg, 2003). Thus in The 
Competitive Advantage of Nations, Porter (1990: 149) argued that: ‘The reasons 
for clustering grow directly out of the determinants of national advantage and 
are a manifestation of their systemic character. One competitive industry helps 
to create another in a mutually reinforcing process’. Later however, he argues 
that:
A cluster is a geographically proximate group of interconnected companies and associ-
ated institutions in a particular ﬁ eld, linked by commonalities and complementarities. 
The geographic scope of clusters ranges from a region, a state, or even a single city to 
span nearby or neighboring countries (e.g., southern Germany and German-speaking 
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Switzerland). The geographic scope of a cluster relates to the distance over which in-
formational, transactional, incentive, and other efﬁ ciencies occur. (Porter, 2000: 16)
As a business economist, Porter has produced an economic model that is both 
an explanation for the success of different industries, countries and regions as 
well as a performative theory because it suggests that the pursuit of particular 
strategies (i.e. clustering) will beneﬁ t industries, countries and regions. As such 
it is a particularly pertinent concept for discussing the performativity of eco-
nomics, especially in relation to the failure of performativity because the theory 
has been subject of a number of criticisms (Malmberg, 2003; Martin and Sunley, 
2003; Malmberg and Power, 2005).
Scholarly analyses of ‘biotech clusters’ are underpinned by an emphasis on 
the more general argument that innovation is a collective and systemic proc-
ess that therefore entails proximity between innovative actors (see Fagerberg, 
2005). Such claims are based on the argument that because innovation is col-
lective it is dependent upon tacit knowledge and face-to-face contact, which, 
because it is difﬁ cult to exchange over distance, necessitates the concentra-
tion of the bioeconomy. Consequently a number of academics have argued 
that biotech innovation is determined by the location of speciﬁ c actors such 
as ‘star scientists’ (Zucker, Darby and Brewer, 1998) or by knowledge spillovers 
(Audretsch and Stephan‚ 1996). However, in the performance of these theories 
there is a subtle shift in emphasis from viewing innovation as concentrated to 
viewing concentrations as innovative because such concentrations enable ac-
cess to hard-to-transfer tacit knowledge. 
Later discussions in economic geography proper gradually moved beyond 
the ‘local-boundedness’ (Phelps, 2004) and away from the earlier more econo-
mistic arguments to show how the bioeconomy has a greater level of geographi-
cal speciﬁ city and particularity than represented by the biotech cluster concept, 
especially in terms of local-global interactions (e.g. Coenen, Moodysson and 
Asheim, 2004; Leibovitz, 2004; Cooke, 2004; Birch, n.d.; forthcoming).1 There 
is also little support for the general notion that clusters are either characterised 
by more localised inter-linkages or encourage more localised interaction or 
collaboration (Malmberg, 2003; Malmberg and Power, 2005). In relation to the 
bioeconomy, ﬁ rms in UK biotech clusters appear to be more tied into national 
and global knowledge networks, whether or not the particular knowledge they 
acquire is explicit or tacit. This is illustrated from data on the location of knowl-
edge acquisition for these types of knowledge across a number of UK ‘clusters’ 
(see Birch, n.d.). 
It is possible to speculate that although cluster theory is not performative in 
the strictest sense for the bioeconomy (i.e. biotech clusters are no more reliant 
on localised innovation), it can be viewed in another light. The description of 
biotech clusters provides the means to identify and constitute certain places as 
centres of the bioeconomy and thereby provide existing and emerging actors 
with an institutional identity (i.e. as a member of a cluster). Thus cluster theory 
is performative in the sense that it instigates institutional isomorphism through 
which actors can make sense of their world (see DiMaggio and Powell, 2004), 
whether or not their economic practices correspond to the representations of 
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the bioeconomy. However, this contrasts with the arguments made by Callon 
and others about economic performativity in ways which I will now discuss.
The Failure of Economic Performativity
and the Making of the Economy
Perhaps the most problematic issue with the theory of performativity is that it 
cannot fail as a theory in itself. It is always able to explain the way we perform eco-
nomics (without explaining why) because it can always bring everything within 
its remit using concepts like agencement (Callon, 2005; 2006). Anything can form 
part of such agencements and no speciﬁ c features are identiﬁ ed, which means 
that ultimately everything can be (and must be) used to explain the performa-
tivity of economics. As such it cannot explain why one thing is more important 
than another or how people understand one thing to be more important than 
another (see Graeber, 2001: 18). Consequently it would appear to be unable 
to incorporate learning (i.e. how people come to judge importance) into the 
theory even though we need to acknowledge that the ‘collective hybridities’ 
represented by agencements are continually changing (inspired by McKinnon, 
2005). Furthermore this failure to incorporate learning is compounded by the 
assumption that economics ‘works’ without explaining what this means outside 
of the theory itself. It thus appears to be a largely self-referential theory. Thus 
virtualism and the emphasis on the performance of economics are more useful 
for understanding the bioeconomy.
Economic performativity is different from the performance of economics 
because the former proposes to explain the way we perform economics (i.e. cal-
culation) without necessarily explaining why we perform economics (i.e. why 
do we calculate?). If we assume that the explanation results from sociotechnical 
agencements (i.e. the co-production of context and performance), we end up 
arguing that we perform economics because economics is performative (i.e. we 
calculate because calculation works). Such a position appears unsatisfactory. 
As Slater (2002: 245) argues, the concept of performativity proposed by Callon 
and others ends up relying on ‘asserting what needs to be explained’ and ‘pre-
suming effects from discourses’. However, if we argue that economics, whilst it 
can be performed, does not ‘work’ in and of itself, then we have to argue that 
the ‘failure’ of performativity is as important – if not more important – as the 
‘success’ of performativity for providing the explanation for why we perform 
economics. 
With virtualism there is a means to provide an explanation which can ac-
count for the failure of economic performativity in that the ‘desire to perform 
and thereby create the idea and ideal of a market’ is achieved with compara-
tive rarity (Miller, 2005: 7). Such failure of performativity or even more simply 
failed performance is incompatible with Callon’s arguments because he posits a 
‘generic’ version of performativity that is therefore ‘all-pervasive’ (MacKenzie, 
2004). In performativity everything can be seen as performance and therefore 
everything is performative, which means that nothing ever fails to perform and 
therefore nothing ever fails to be performative. In one sense then, Callon’s per-
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formativity can only explain that which exists, but it cannot explain that which 
attempted to exist and ‘failed’ to do so because it cannot study that which does 
not exist. Thus we could argue that the incompleteness of a contract, for exam-
ple, enables it to function as White and Bradshaw (2004) do, but we would then 
not be acknowledging that if a contract is not actually ‘functioning’ (i.e. work-
ing) then there may be another explanation for this failure of performativity. 
Virtualism enables us to consider what a failure to be performative might 
mean. Instead of assuming that the bioeconomy ‘works’, especially its spatial 
embedding in ‘biotech clusters’, it is more useful to consider how the bioecono-
my can result from economic representations (e.g. clusters) and practices (e.g. 
clustering) that do not necessarily correspond to one another (i.e. the conse-
quences are different from those claimed). In this sense we can argue that the 
‘biotech cluster’ is a virtual abstraction that replaces the diversity and speciﬁ city 
of place with a representation that naturalises certain claims as absolute and 
therefore not subject to failure (i.e. that do not work). In fairness, performativ-
ity attempts to avoid this position by casting the concepts of ‘entanglement’ and 
‘disentanglement’ as ‘two sides of the same process’ (Holm, 2002: 10), which 
virtualism does not separate (see Miller, 2002). However, this means that once 
again everything is deemed to be an element of the performativity process and 
therefore that it still cannot explain why we perform economics. 
Virtualism provides a tool to at least attempt to answer the question of why 
certain things are brought within calculative markets and other things are not 
(see Graeber, 2001 for a discussion of non-calculative exchange). We could 
even argue that calculative markets, rather than being a means of disentangle-
ment, are themselves merely an overﬂ ow from the rest of the social system that 
can ‘“mop up” these overﬂ owing externalities’ (Miller, 2002: 221). More perti-
nent here is that such disentanglements could really be the production of vir-
tual abstractions, which serves another role to that envisaged in performativity. 
The virtual abstraction (e.g. biotech cluster) does not need to represent a set of 
economic practices (e.g. clustering) for the representation of such practices to 
have an effect on economic practices; i.e. actors who adhere to these represen-
tations appear predictable and trustworthy and therefore beneﬁ t from ‘failed’ 
performativity (e.g. biotech ﬁ rms in a cluster appear worthy of investment) (see 
Carrier, 1997; Ferraro, Pfeffer and Sutton, 2005). Thus the failure of economic 
performance can still produce economic practices in contrast to the claim that 
it is because economics ‘works’ that it is performative. 
The reason that failure is so important in the performance of economics 
is that it enables the change and production of economies and markets. As 
already mentioned, the failure to perform economics does not hinder eco-
nomic practices because in the pursuit of failed performance an actor ap-
pears sensible and therefore predictable. The representation of economic 
practices, such as the argument that the bioeconomy consists of ‘biotech clus-
ters’, produces an expectation about the world that seeks to describe how 
the world works and therefore makes economic practices such as clustering 
prospectively and retrospectively sensible. For example, in their work on the 
‘sociology of technological expectations’, Brown and Michael (2003: 6) argue 
that the tendency to ‘fetishise’ the ‘soon to be’ naturalises current practices 
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by representing them as the inevitable solution to particular future problems. 
However, the failure of performance also drives change and therefore inno-
vation through adaptation in that where economic practices (e.g. clustering) 
do not ‘work’ it encourages different practices (e.g. global searching). Con-
sequently new ways of doing are necessary and in turn necessitate new modes 
of exchange and new practices. 
Bioeconomics: The Logic of Morbidity
As the rationale for this special issue illustrates, there have been a number of 
attempts – some in passing, others not – to conceptualise the relationship be-
tween the biosciences and economy in biopolitical terms (e.g. Novas and Rose, 
2000; Rose, 2001; Waldby, 2002; Lemke, 2005a; Rabinow and Rose, 2006; Rajan, 
2006). The proliferation of research and debate around Foucault’s (1978: 139–
45) concept of biopolitics has been considerable over the past few years. This 
is partially, at least, because the concept covers an array of interpretations from 
government policy through the deﬁ nition of a particular epoch to a morality of 
society (see Larsen, 2003). Foucault (1978: 139) described two forms of ‘power 
over life’ – one centred on the individual body and the other on the population 
– both of which contributed to the expansion and development of the modern 
capitalist economy which: ‘…would not have been possible without the control-
led insertion of bodies into the machinery of production and the adjustment of 
the phenomena of population to economic processes’ (1978: 141).
With the recent developments in the biosciences, touching as they do the 
genetic basis of life, the calculation of life at the scale of both the individual 
body and the wider population takes on a new meaning in relation to the mod-
ern economy (Rose, 2001; Rabinow and Rose, 2006; Rajan, 2006). Thus the 
production of health or vitality – what Waldby (2002) terms biovalue – has been 
constituted in terms of bioeconomics which ‘operates according to logics of 
vitality, not mortality’ (Rabinow and Rose‚ 2006: 211). 
The central concern with the ‘calculation of life’ makes the issues raised 
earlier around economic performativity and virtualism pertinent to this debate. 
In particular, the question of how we calculate life is crucial. Several attempts 
to do so have highlighted the difference between calculations at the individual 
level such as treatment models based on quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) and 
those at the population level such as Agamben’s (1998) arguments about homer 
sacer and societal exclusion. Such attempts reveal the central problem underly-
ing the calculation of life: how do we place a value on life in either economic or 
moral terms? The continuing contestation and critique of intellectual property 
rights shows how problematic this is in economic terms, whilst the growth of 
debate in bioethics and medical ethics proves how difﬁ cult it is in moral terms. 
Thus it is understandable that the focus of bioeconomics has predominantly 
been on the expected beneﬁ ts to health and vitality from new biotechnologies 
as evident in the concepts of the ‘political economy of hope’ and the ‘politics 
of potentiality’ (e.g. Novas and Rose, 2000; Ganchoff, 2004; Novas, 2006; Rajan, 
2006), rather than on the valuation and calculation of life per se. 
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The central issue here is therefore whether and how health can constitute 
value in the bioeconomy. It is useful to consider a number of existing analyses 
that draw on the theory of biopolitics to do this; these include Waldby’s (2002) 
concept of biovalue and Novas’ (2006) political economy of hope, but could refer 
to others just as well. Biovalue is deﬁ ned as the: ‘…yield of vitality produced by 
the biotechnical reformulation of living processes. Biotechnology tries to gain 
traction in living processes, to induce them to increase or change their produc-
tivity’ (Waldby, 2002: 310).
As such it represents a ‘surplus of fragmentary vitality’ that is ‘involved in 
the production of health’ (Waldby, 2002: 310). From an economics perspective 
this does not make much sense because it implies that vitality (i.e. health) al-
ready exists and that it is the surplus of vitality (i.e. health) that is economically 
productive. Thus it is possible to argue that biovalue does not come from the 
production of health – as much because health does not already exist to be ex-
ploited but also because it is socially constituted (see Conrad and Gabe, 1999) 
– and rather it is the failure to perform or produce vitality that necessitates a 
turn to the abstraction of hope (e.g. Novas, 2006). Even from a sociological or 
anthropological perspective the alignment of value with health does not really 
ﬁ t either if we agree with the idea that economic exchange requires both simi-
larity and difference (see Graeber, 2001: 15). Similarity is necessary because it 
facilitates the establishment of a ﬁ xed value (e.g. money) which enables the 
exchange of things with no ﬁ xed value (i.e. difference). 
This means that ‘biovalue’ does not originate from the production of health 
or the ‘yield of vitality’ from modern biotechnologies. Instead the value of mod-
ern biotechnology can be seen as the failure of vitality with the attendant im-
plications this has for the failure of biopolitical strategies themselves. It is the 
continual failure of such strategies that not only necessitates their continued 
application but also produces new individuals and populations that therefore 
require new strategies (see Larsen, 2003: 7). In bioeconomic terms this means 
that it is the failure of health or vitality that produces value because it provides 
the means of exchange in which there is a ﬁ xed value (i.e. health) and a cor-
responding unﬁ xed value (i.e. ill-health). Thus there is little economic point to 
bioscience research that does not identify illness or morbidity because this pro-
vides the value from biotechnical treatments that seek to produce a ﬁ xed value 
in relation to the differences in our individual bodies (see Rose, 2001: 21). If 
we take this beyond the individual level, it is possible to argue that the bioeco-
nomics of populations necessitates a high proportion of unhealthy members 
in order to produce national or group value from the biosciences; a reversal 
of eugenics perhaps, in which the unhealthiest populations produce the most 
economic value. This is what I see as the logic of morbidity.
Conclusion
There is a deﬁ nite scale issue in the conceptualisation of bioeconomics, one 
that Foucault highlights in his identiﬁ cation of an individual and population 
basis for biopolitics. Thus it is possible to argue that the global dimensions of 
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the bioeconomy are tied into the bodily strategies enacted on individuals and 
vice versa. In this article I have sought to show how the current and ongoing 
debate around economic performativity and virtualism provides a useful means 
to explore such issues. For example, Leyshon et al. (2005) argue that virtualism 
explains the large scale better than small scale, which perhaps explains why it 
proves useful in certain circumstances where performativity does not. In con-
trast Callon argues that we need to avoid macro-scale analyses of economies 
and markets (Barry, Slater and Callon, 2002: 302), but in so doing misses out 
on considering the role of scale in understanding something like the bioecono-
my.[2] At different scales different claims and policies appear sensible, whether 
or not they actually work in the performative sense. For example, bioeconomy 
clusters can be seen as claims to attract global ﬁ nance when made at a global 
scale, whilst they are also simultaneously claims to produce institutional identity 
at a local scale. In both cases the failure of economic performance (i.e. the lack 
of cluster characteristics of biotech clusters) does not preclude an alternative 
effect on economic practices.
In ﬂ attening scale with a network approach like performativity we end up 
with the structure (i.e. network) representing the explanation. Consequently 
we are liable to end up with a tautological explanation. Since it has been argued 
that performativity corresponds most closely with Granovetter’s (1985) network 
analysis in economic sociology (see Barry and Slater, 2005b: 13), it is possible 
to argue that it encounters similar difﬁ culties. For example, Krippner (2001: 
799) has argued that Granovetter isolates a ‘single aspect of social life’ which 
he then ‘analyzed solely in their structural aspect’. Thus performativity can be 
seen to rely on network structures (i.e. agencements) that are as much social 
constructions in which economic activities occur as was the idea of institutional 
embedding in economic sociology which Callon (1998a) originally criticised. 
That is unless such networks can include everything in which case they would 
prove particularly problematic. An agencement can include anything that the 
author wants and we cannot distinguish between the different elements.
In outlining how the failure of performativity is necessary for markets and 
economies it is possible to show how the concept of bioeconomics is also as 
dependent upon the failure of things to work (e.g. health). It is in this fail-
ure of vitality that the bioeconomy produces value and through the logic of 
morbidity that we can understand how the differences and similarities between 
values enable the economic exchange of modern biotechnology. Through the 
production of illness, new genetics provides the means to differentiate between 
use values (i.e. treatment) that are tied into the ﬁ xed abstraction of health as 
exchange value. In this way it is possible to see how bioeconomics embodies a 
reversal of eugenics in that morbidity both produces economic value (i.e. na-
tional competitiveness) and moral value in the form of individual responsibility 
to acquire, develop and maintain the vitality of our own bodies. 
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Notes
1 There is a distinction between ‘new economic geography’ associated with the work of the 
economist Paul Krugman and economic geography itself. The latter has a long disciplinary 
pedigree stretching back several decades, whereas the former is a relatively recent perspec-
tive in economics that seeks to incorporate geography into economic modelling. 
2 I want to stress that the different theories of virtualism and performativity are not nec-
essarily mutually exclusive. The debate has obviously been somewhat heated to date (e.g. 
Holm, 2002; Miller, 2002; 2005; Callon, 2005), so it is important to acknowledge that the 
theory of performativity is useful for understanding certain markets. However, I would argue 
that it is more useful in relation to the micro-scale – as Callon intends (Barry, Slater and Cal-
lon, 2002) – and in reference to ﬁ nancial markets (e.g. MacKenzie, 2004). With regards to 
economic practices in organisations (e.g. corporations), which represent a signiﬁ cant pro-
portion of all economic activities (Hodgson, 2005), or in everyday transactions it may prove 
less useful because there is considerably more room for failure. Thus it may not be applicable 
to understanding the impact of economic theories in organisations where calculation may 
prove less central (see Ferraro, Pfeffer and Sutton, 2005).
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